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For most of the American experience with a federal income 
tax, the U.S.  economy has operated under a nominal tax system. 
The essence of a nominal tax system is the designation in dollar 
terms of rate brackets, exemption levels, and other items that 
figure into the definition of taxable income.  The dollar levels 
of these items are set in legislation, only to be changed by 
subsequent acts of Congress. 
The problems associated with a nominal tax system in an 
economy with sustained, nonzero rates of inflation, even 
perfectly anticipated and stable rates of inflation, have been 
long recognized and much discussed.  Just a few of the better- 
known examples include the papers by  Fischer and Modigliani 
(1978) and Fischer (1981), and the volumes by Aaron  (1976),  Tanzi 
(1980), and Feldstein (1983). 
The past decade, however, has seen an important and 
historically unique development in the structure of the U.S. 
personal tax system.  Motivated by the political recognition that 
distortions created by  the interaction of the tax system and the 
high inflation rates of the 1970s had exacted significant costs 
on the U.S  economy, Congress legislated limited indexation for 
inflation into the personal tax code with the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act  (ERTA)  of 1981.  Although inflation rates had fallen 
substantially from the extraordinary levels of 1980 and 1981, 
ERTA1s  indexing provisions were extended in the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmIndexation of the personal tax code has important 
implications for current monetary policy debates.  While few 
participants in these debates disagree with the proposition that 
the goal of monetary policy should be predictability of the 
inflation rate, few agree on the "correctM inflation rate.  To 
the extent that a primary, perhaps the primary, case against 
positive sustained inflation involves distortions that arise 
through interactions with the tax system, we might ask whether 
these arguments are substantially mitigated by  indexation.  It is 
thus a good time to reexamine the potential costs of anticipated 
inflation in light of the inflation-indexing scheme currently in 
place.  Such a reexamination is the focus of this paper. 
After reviewing the specifics of the indexing legislated 
during the 1980s, we provide some back-of-the-envelope  estimates 
of the distortionary costs of inflation under the current tax 
regime.  We focus exclusively on the personal tax code and 
concentrate on two types of indexation -- bracket indexation and 
indexation for capital-income adjustment.' 
Bracket indexation refers to adjustments in the dollar value 
of the tax bracket limits that determine an individual taxpayer's 
marginal tax rate.  Failing to index tax brackets in the face of 
positive inflation causes marginal tax rates to increase 
independent of increases in real income, a phenomenon widely 
known as "bracket creep."  The indexing provisions of the current 
tax system are primarily designed to alleviate the problem of 
' This terminology follows Tanzi (1980). 
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with a lag of approximately one year, bracket indexation in the 
current tax code is incomplete. 
Indexation for capital-income adjustment refers to the 
problem of mismeasuring taxable capital income in inflationary 
environments.  Specifically, when the rate of inflation is 
positive, a portion of the nominal rate of return to capital is 
repayment of principal.  It is necessary to recognize this 
repayment in order to  arrive at the real value of capital income. 
Doing so requires adjustment of the basis on which capital income 
is calculated, an adjustment that is not incorporated by  simple 
bracket indexation.  Indexation for capital-income adjustment 
thus requires taxable income to  be adjusted in such a way that 
individuals are taxed on real capital income and not on nominal 
interest income.  Such adjustments are not currently provided for 
in the U.S.  personal tax code. 
We maintain that distortions created by  the combination of 
imperfect bracket indexation and the failure to index for 
capital-income adjustment likely result in substantial economic 
costs.  Perhaps more important, raising revenues through 
inflation/tax-system  interactions is very inefficient.  According 
to our calculations, revenues raised by the effects of a 
permanent, perfectly anticipated inflation rate of 4 percent 
would  result in an annual outputloss in the range of 2.5  to 4.5 
percent of GNP relative to a policy that maintains zero inflation 
(or  with perfect indexation) and raises an equivalent level of 
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tax rates. 
Although our estimates are admittedly back-of-the-envelope, 
we have attempted to make the envelope as reasonable as possible. 
We use the type of general-equilibrium simulation framework 
employed extensively in much formal tax research (for  example, by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987]).  Furthermore, one need not accept 
the specific quantitative implications of our simulation 
experiments to conclude that the costs of even moderate inflation 
continue to be substantial, even after accounting for the effects 
of tax reform in the 1980s, and that the magnitude of these 
distortions argues strongly against dependence on the interaction 
of inflation and the personal tax code as a revenue source. 
11.  The Indexing Provisions of the Personal Tax Code 
Indexation of the personal tax code formally commenced in 
1985 under the provisions of ERTA.  Ad  hoc indexation, in the 
form of periodic adjustments in nominal tax brackets, personal 
exemption levels, and so on, were periodically legislated prior 
to 1985, but ERTA represented the first time regular, ongoing 
inflation ad.justments  were codified in the tax laws. 
Indexation, as defined by ERTA, requires annual adjustments 
in the dollar value of tax bracket limits and personal exemption 
levels using a cost-of-living  index derived from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index for all urban wage earners 
(CPIU).  The specifics of ERTA effectively define the rate of 
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for the 12-month period ending September 30 of the year prior to 
the tax year, relative to the average CPIU for the analogous 
period in 1984. 
Due to the nonsynchronization of tax years and "index 
years,I1  ERTA mandated that inflation adjustments be made with an 
approximate lag of one year.'  For example, the cost-of-living 
index for 1986 was calculated by  dividing the average CPIU for 
the period spanning October 1984 through September 1985 by the 
average CPIU for the period spanning October 1983 through 
September 1984.  Tax-bracket limits and personal exemption levels 
for tax year 1986 were then adjusted by multiplying the statutory 
bracket limits and personal exemption levels in effect for the 
1984 tax year by the resulting cost-of-living index. 
Although the indexing provisions of ERTA were in effect for 
only two years before being superseded by the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (TRA86), TRA86 extended the indexing scheme specified by 
ERTA, with only minor modifications.  First, TRA86 eliminated the 
zero-bracket amount of taxable income, that is, the taxable 
income level below which the marginal tax rate is zero.  By way 
of compensation, personal exemption levels, the standard 
deduction level, and the earned-income tax credit for low-income 
An "index year1!  is referred to in ERTA as a "calendar year." 
As  our subsequent  discussion  makes  clear,  this  terminology  is 
somewhat misleading in that its reference to a calendar year does 
not correspond to  a 12-month period that spans  January to December. 
Tax years, on the other hand, do correspond to the usual January- 
to-December calendar year. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmtaxpayers were extended.  In conjunction with this change, TRA86 
extended inflation indexing to the standard deduction and the 
earned-income credit. 
The second modification involved minor changes in the way 
the cost-of-living index is calculated.  The cost-of-living  index 
is now calculated by dividing the average CPIU for the 12-month 
period ending August 31 of the year prior to the relevant tax 
year by the average CPIU for the corresponding period ending 
August 31, 1987. 
The indexing provisions of TRA86 are in force as of this 
writing. 
111.  What the Current Indexing Scheme Doesn't  Index 
Without discounting the importance of the indexing 
provisions introduced by ERTA and TRA86, it is clear that 
insulation of the current personal tax code from inflation is far 
from perfect, even ignoring problems associated with the 
construction of an adequate index of the true inflation rate. 
Our discussion focuses on what we perceive to be the two major 
inadequacies of the current indexing regime: lagged indexation of 
bracket levels and the failure to index for capital-income 
mismeasurement. 
A simple example will suffice to demonstrate that, with an 
indexing scheme that adjusts tax brackets with a one-year lag, 
positive inflation will generally raise average marginal tax 
rates.  Suppose that the tax-rate schedule at time zero is given 
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Suppose further that the rate of inflation equals T  in year 1  and 
every year thereafter.  Then the sequence of marginal tax rates 
faced by an individual with a constant real income equal to Y is 
given by 
Nominal  Real 





For the individual in this hypothetical example, sustained 
inflation permanently increases his or her marginal tax rate, 
even though the nominal income brackets are eventually adjusted 
for price-level changes. 
It is important to reemphasize that our current indexing 
does indeed provide some protection against bracket creep.  For a 
tax-rate schedule with static nominal bracket limits, sustained, 
positive inflation will ultimately push all taxpayers into the 
top rate bracket.  This will not occur under the indexing 
provisions of ERTA and TRA86.  With lagged indexation, however, 
the protection provided is imperfect: bracket creep is bounded, 
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The second major deficiency of the current indexing regime 
that we will consider is the failure to index for capital-income 
mismeasurement.  Since this problem is well known, a simple 
example will again suffice as illustration. 
Suppose that an individual of age s has total income given 
by ~,=~~*+ia,~,,  where Y*  and i  are the nominal wage payments to an 
age s individual and the nominal interest rate, respectively. 
Bracket indexation is essentially equivalent to deflating Y, by 
l+a.  But this is clearly inappropriate for measuring real 
capital income.  By definition, the nominal interest rate is 
defined by the relation (l+r  )=(l+r) (l+a)  .  Real asset income is 
therefore given by 
This example clearly shows that bracket indexation alone does not 
adequately adjust nominal capital income for inflation, since the 
adjustment procedure ignores the fact that part of the nominal 
return to capital reflects an adjustment for the repayment of 
principal lost due to inflation (measured by the term 
aa,_  ,/  ( l+w 
Note that, as defined here, capital-income mismeasurement 
problems arise even when individuals face constant marginal tax 
rates.  Under a progressive tax system, the overstatement of 
capital income because of incomplete adjustments for inflation 
can also have the effect of pushing individuals into higher 
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with an increase in real capital income. 
We choose not to confound the capital-income measurement 
problem with the bracket creep problem in our subsequent 
analysis.  For this reason, when we refer to pure bracket creep, 
we will define nominal taxable income as Y'=W,*+  (L -T)  a,-,  . 
Similarly, when we refer to capital-income mismeasurement, we 
will adjust the calculation of income for tax purposes so that 
the addition of the term ra,-,/(l+w) )  does not cause individuals 
to be pushed into higher marginal tax-rate brackets solely as a 
result of higher inflation. 
The  balance of this paper is devoted to an assessment of the 
cost, in economic terms, of incomplete indexation given the 
current structure of the personal tax code.  We address this 
issue specifically by way of simulation exercises with a simple 
general-equilibrium  model of the economy.  Before presenting the 
results of our model simulations, it will be useful to describe 
briefly the nature of our model.  Readers interested only in the 
results of our simulations can skip the next section without much 
loss of continuity. 
IV.  A General-Equilibrium Model of the Economy 
Our analysis uses the overlapping-generations  framework of 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) (AK).  We will only briefly 
describe its structure here.  More detailed discussions of the 
model can be found in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)  or Altig and 
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The basic AK framework assumes that the economy is 
populated by a sequence of distinct cohorts, identical in every 
respect, with the possible exception of size.  Each generation 
lives for 55 years and is l+n times larger than its predecessor. 
Like Auerbach and Kotlikoff, we assume that lifetimes and 
consumption/investment  opportunities are known by all individuals 
with perfect certainty. 
Given a sequence of interest rates and wages, an 
individual in our version of the AK model maximizes a time- 
separable utility function given by 
The preference parameters P, a,,  a,, and a represent, 
respectively, the individual's subjective time-discount factor, 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (c), 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure  (l),  and 
utility weight of leisure.  The subscript s denotes a period of 
life, which we have interpreted as a year.  Each cohort is 
indexed by the subscript v,  which corresponds to the year in 
which the generation is "born." 
Equation (1) is maximized subject to a sequence of budget 
constraints given by 
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age s at time t, f, is the after-tax return to capital at time t, 
and w, is the after-tax market wage at time t.  The variable r 
refers to a lump-sum tax.  Equation (2) is easily extended to the 
case of multiple assets by interpreting atas,  at-l,s-l,  and f, as 
vectors and by  including the appropriate market-clearing 
conditions. 
The variable E,  in equation (2) is the productivity 
endowment of an individual in the sth  period of life.  The life- 
cycle profile for E,  is specified exogenously by the function 
~,=4.47  +  0.033s - 0.00067s2.  This specification is taken from 
Welch (1979), and yields a labor productivity profile that peaks 
at s=25 or, interpreting s=l as age 20, when an individual is 
approximately 45 years old. 
In  addition to equation (2), we impose the initial condition 
atIl=0,  for all t, and the terminal condition that the present 
value of lifetime resources not exceed the present value of 
lifetime consumption plus tax payments.  In the present model, 
this lifetime wealth constraint implies that ata5,=0. In other 
words, there is no bequest motive. 
Wage and capital incomes are obtained as payments received 
from competitive firms that combine capital and labor using a 
neoclassical production technology.  The aggregate production 
technology is Cobb-Douglas, defined over aggregate capital and 
labor supplies as 
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capital and labor supplies are defined from individual supplies 
as 
55 
K, =  ( I  +n)  "lx  as,  t-1 
s=l ( 1  +n)  s-55 
and 
The assumption of perfect competition means that gross wage and 
capital-income payments (w  and r) will equal the marginal 
products of labor and capital. 
The specification of the model is completed by the goods- 
market-clearing condition 
where 
and  6 is the rate of depreciation on physical capital.  Note that 
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expenditures are zero.  Because we wish to isolate the 
distortionary effects of inflation-induced changes in marginal 
tax rates, we will always assume that all revenues raised by 
distortionary taxation are redistributed to the affected 
individuals  via lump-sum transfers.  Thus,  we assume that net tax 
revenues are always zero, so that we can dispense with the 
specification  of the government's budget constraint. 
An equilibrium in this model will be characterized by 
sequences of wages and capital returns such that individual labor 
and consumption choices are consistent with the aggregate 
conditions in equations (3) through  (7)  . 
We do not explicitly model a monetary sector.  Inflation is 
introduced into our framework by the addition of an arbitrary 
unit of account.  We thus ignore the effects of seigniorage and 
any distortions that arise through the inflation tax per se. 
Once values are chosen for the model's parameters, solutions 
are obtained using numerical methods.  Our benchmark 
parameterization is reported in table 1.  These values are 
generally consistent with those found in other simulation studies 
(see, for example, AK and Prescott [1986]), and are motivated by 
independent empirical studies. 
V.  Bracket  Creep  in the Current  Tax  Code 
The potential for bracket creep effects has, as intended, 
been substantially reduced by ERTA and especially by  TRA86.  The 
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the introduction of indexation, but also from structural rate 
changes that lowered marginal tax rates and reduced the number of 
effective tax brackets. 
An indication of how the magnitude of the bracket creep 
problem is dependent on specific tax-rate structures is given in 
figure 1, which depicts hypothetical time series for the average 
marginal tax rate under three distinct rate-structure 
assumptions.  The chosen rate schedules include one from the pre- 
ERTA period  (1971), one from the post-ERTA/pre-TFtA86  period 
(1982),  and one from the post-TFtA86 period  (1989).~  The 
hypothetical series in figure 1 were generated as answers to the 
following question: Holding fixed both the tax-rate structure and 
the distribution of pre-tax personal income, what effect would 
our actual inflationary experience have had on the average 
taxpayer's marginal tax rate in the absence of any indexation? 
Of the three rate schedules we considered, the 1971 schedule 
had the most rate brackets  (24)  and the highest marginal tax rate 
(70  percent).  It is also the rate schedule under which the 
effects of bracket creep are most dramatic,  Had the 1971 rate 
schedule remained in effect until 1989, our estimates indicate 
that inflation would have increased the marginal tax rate faced 
To provide a consistent basis  for comparison, the dollar 
values of the bracket limits contained in the 1982 and 1989 rate 
schedules were converted to 1971 values using the CPIU. 
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Restricting attention to the period prior to enactment of ERTA, 
by 1981 inflation would have raised the average marginal tax rate 
by 45 percent.5 
By 1982, the number of tax brackets had been reduced from 24 
to 12 and the top marginal tax rate had been cut to 50 percent. 
Simplifying somewhat,  TRA86 further reduced the number of tax 
brackets to four and the top marginal tax rate to 33 per~ent.~ 
Judged by the hypothetical impact of bracket creep depicted in 
figure 1, both ERTA and, especially, TRA86 appear to have 
significantly reduced the degree of progressivity in the personal 
Our calculations  assume  that the average taxpayer is one of 
a family of four,  claims slightly more than the standard deduction, 
and faces the statutory rate schedule for married persons filing 
jointly.  We have also assumed, counterfactually, that the dollar 
amounts of personal exemption and standard deduction allowances 
kept pace with annual realizations of the rate of inflation, and 
that the ratio of taxable to nontaxable income remains unchanged. 
We do not  suggest that this number reflects the  actual 
change in the average marginal tax rate from 1971 through 1981. We 
have  completely ignored tax avoidance behavior, changes in the 
distribution of income, and other complications  that  might have had 
a  significant  impact  on  the  average  rate  actually  realized. 
Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 instituted, among other 
things, increases in the dollar values of  rate brackets, thus 
implementing a degree of ad hoc indexation. 
The exact determination of marginal tax rates  under TRA86 is 
complicated by  the phase-out  of personal  exemptions at  higher 
income levels.  .  For simplicity, we utilize published rates for 
taxable incomes below $155,320 (Schedule Y-1 in the Instructions 
for Form 1040, Internal  Revenue Service)  and assume a marginal tax 
rate of 28 percent for all income above $155,320. 
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effect since 1971, our calculations imply that inflation would 
have increased the average marginal tax rate on personal income 
by only 17 percent. 
It is clear from figure 1 that the rate reductions 
legislated in TRA86 can, relative to the rate structures of the 
two prior decades, significantly reduce the effects of bracket 
creep.  The relevant question in the current environment is, of 
course, whether the current indexing scheme, in conjunction with 
the mitigating effects of the TRA86 rate structure, effectively 
eliminates the problem of bracket creep. 
Recall from our discussion above that the specifics of the 
indexing provisions contained in ERTA and TRA86 are such that 
bracket indexation effectively takes place with a lag of one 
year.  The issue of how well our current tax code protects 
individuals from bracket creep fundamentally concerns the issue 
of how much this one-year lag matters.  What, then, does our 
version of the AK simulation model tell us about the long-run 
cost of a sustained inflation rate under a personal income tax 
We  emphasize  some  important  qualifications  to  this 
statement.  First,  measuring the  progressivity of the  tax system is 
a  subtle  and  ambiguous  enterprise  (see, for  example,  Kiefer 
[I984  ]  ) .  Second,  as  we have noted,  our calculations  ignore changes 
in some important determinants of the level of taxable income to 
which specific tax rates apply. Chief among these for TRA86 are 
increases in  standard deductions, personal  exemptions, and  the 
earned-income  credit.  These  provisions  are  likely  to  have 
important  effects on the  progressivity of the  personal tax code for 
low-income taxpayers  (see Pechman [1987]).  Our suggestion that 
progressivity was reduced by ERTA and TRA86 should thus  be taken in 
the casual spirit in which it is given. 
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the tax code as of 1989?~ 
The results of our bracket creep experiments are given in 
table 2 and figure 2.9  Table 2 reports the steady-state, annual 
percentage loss in output caused by bracket creep for economies 
with 4 percent and 10 percent steady-state inflation rates, 
assuming an indexation scheme that adjusts with a one-year lag, 
as in ERTA and TRA86.I0  The output losses are measured relative 
to economies with zero steady-state inflation rates, and are 
reported in table 2 for several alternative parameterizations. 
Figure 2 plots the outcomes of simulations with inflation rates 
ranging from 1 percent to 10 percent for three different 
assumptions about a,,  the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption. 
The actual tax-rate structure relevant to our simulations 
has marginal tax rates that range from 15 to 28 percent.  These 
rates  necessarily differ from those realized in the actual economy 
for two reasons.  First, life-cycle  variations represent the only 
income heterogeneity in our model.  The distribution of income in 
the model is therefore substantially compressed relative to the 
actual economy.  Consequently, no agent in the model  faces the 
highest tax rate (33 percent) or the lowest tax rate (0  percent). 
Second,  to facilitate  convergence,  we have allowed the tax code to 
be continuous for a small range of incomes along the transition 
from a 15 percent marginal tax rate to a 28 percent marginal tax 
rate. 
9  Recall that we isolate the effects of bracket creep only 
by first indexing for  capital-income  measurement in the simulation 
exercises.  As  noted  above, this  is  accomplished  by  defining 
nominal income as Y*=w~*+  [I -a)  as.l. 
lo  With lagged indexation, steady-state inflation distortions 
amount to permanently increasing an individual s nominal income, 
relative to the tax bracket limits, by l+a. 
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anticipated annual inflation rate of 4 percent, the distortionary 
effects of bracket creep result in an annual steady-state output 
loss of 1.3  percent.  To put this number in perspective, real GNP 
in 1989 was $4,024 billion, 1.3  percent of which equalled about 
$52 billion, or about $209 for every American.  Assuming an 
annual growth rate of 2 percent and an after-tax discount rate of 
4 percent, the present value of an annual output loss of this 
magnitude is about $2.7  trillion.'' 
The distortionary effects are smaller when we let ac=5,  thus 
assuming a lesser willingness of individuals to substitute 
consumption over time.  Still, even in this more conservative 
case, the interaction of bracket creep and a 4 percent steady- 
state inflation rate results in an annual loss of about $48 
billion, again using 1989 as a benchmark. 
Note that, for the three cases depicted in figure 2,  the 
magnitudes of the percentage losses that arise from bracket creep 
distortions diverge as the rate of inflation increases. 
Furthermore, for a given preference specification, the limiting 
value of output losses from bracket creep appear to be reached at 
lower rates of inflation, the higher the value of a,.  This 
pattern reflects both the maintained preference structure and the 
assumed tax-rate schedule. 
Consider, for example, ac=5  preferences.  When ac=5, 
'' In general, if the after-tax discount rate equals f and the 
growth rate of output equals p,  the present value of a sustained 
output loss equal to YL equals YL-  (l+f)  /  (f  -p)  . 
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relative to the cases in which individuals are more willing to 
substitute consumption intertemporally.  Furthermore, in the ac=5 
case, the chosen profiles are relatively insensitive to policy- 
induced changes in after-tax wages and interest rates.  Thus, 
individuals are less likely to substitute consumption and leisure 
to low marginal tax-rate phases of the life cycle than is the 
case when ac<5,  and so relatively more individuals in the ac=5 
economy end up facing the highest marginal tax rate.  Because the 
bracket creep phenomenon disappears when there are no more 
brackets to creep into, the effects of bracket creep are less 
dramatic at higher inflation rates for the ac=5  case than for the 
ac=3 case.  By the same logic, the effects of bracket creep are 
less dramatic at higher inflation rates for the ac=3 case than 
for the aC=l  case. 
By  focusing solely on the distortionary output loss 
associated with bracket creep, we leave out a potentially 
important, and arguably the most important, element of the 
analysis: the fact that bracket creep does indeed raise revenues. 
To the extent that bracket creep is a relatively efficient form 
of revenue generation, the output losses reported in table 2 and 
figure 2 are not appropriate indicators of the welfare losses 
arising from bracket creep. 
To assess the efficiency of raising revenues through bracket 
creep, we can ask the following question:  For a given rate of 
inflation, what is the level of steady-state output associated 
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in which an equivalent amount of revenue is raised by  increasing 
all marginal tax rates proportionately?  In a strict sense, our 
simulations assume that net tax revenues are zero, since we have 
assumed that lump-sum transfers offset all revenues raised 
through distortionary taxation.  In the subsequent analysis, we 
refer to the revenue raised in each of our simulations as the 
level of the lump-sum subsidy or tax necessary to  maintain zero 
net taxes. 
Figure 3 plots the loss of output from the distortionary 
effects of bracket creep measured relative to the distortionary 
costs of equal revenue changes in the rate structure.  We again 
plot results for the ac=3,  ac=l,  and ac=5  preference structures. 
The message of figure 3 is clear:  Bracket creep is an 
extremely inefficient method of raising revenue.  For the 
benchmark case with a 4 percent steady-state rate of inflation, 
taxes raised through bracket creep result in a steady-state 
output that is 1.2  percent less than the steady-state output 
level that would result from raising an equal amount of revenue 
through proportionate increases in statutory marginal tax rates. 
With the 1989 benchmark, this difference amounts to a $48 billion 
output loss from exercising the inflationary, rather than 
legislative, revenue option.  Furthermore, the relative output 
loss increases with the rate of inflation.  For a 10 percent rate 
of inflation, revenues raised through bracket creep in the 
benchmark simulation exact an additional annual output cost of 
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proportionately increasing marginal tax rates. 
It is useful to note that the different output levels in the 
bracket creep case and the statutory rate change case result from 
a difference in the life-cycle incidence of the two types of tax 
changes.  Unlike the case in which revenues are raised from 
proportionately increasing all marginal tax rates, bracket creep 
alters the incentive to save across phases of the life-cycle in 
which individuals face high and low marginal tax rates.  The 
resulting relative intertemporal price changes interact with 
general-equilibrium effects to disproportionately burden the high 
savers in our model when taxes are raised through bracket creep; 
hence the larger output costs associated with revenue generation 
via the interaction of inflation and the nominal tax structure. 
VI.  What  Bracket Indexation  Can't  Fix:  The Case of  Capital Income 
Thus far, we have examined only distortions created by the 
interaction of progression in the U.S.  tax-rate structure and the 
current practice of adjusting nominal brackets with a one-year 
lag.  These distortions could be eliminated, or at least 
substantially mitigated, either by making the tax-rate structure 
less progressive or by reducing the lag between the tax year and 
index year.  Neither of these changes,  however, would eliminate 
the other source of inflation distortion noted above: the failure 
to index for capital-income adjustment. 
Recall that simply deflating by 1+~  is not sufficient to 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmconvert nominal capital income to real capital income--converting 
income in this way ignores the fact that part of the nominal 
return to capital is a repayment of principal lost through the 
effects of inflation.  But bracket indexation, even perfect 
bracket indexation, basically amounts to dividing nominal income 
by l+s, and so provides no protection to the taxpayer from the 
mismeasurement of capital income due to inflation. 
Assessing the economic impact of inadequate inflation 
accounting in the measurement of capital income is complicated 
enormously by the different tax treatment afforded income from 
different asset  and by the fact that  good portion of the 
tax levied on capital income occurs at the firm level.12  We 
sidestep most of these complications and consider two very basic 
types of experiments.  In the first,  we abstract from the bracket 
creep problem and simply simulate the long-run effect of 
incorrectly calculating capital income when the steady-state rate 
of inflation is nonzero.  In this case, taxable income is defined 
I2  A  similar problem, which we have  ignored, arises with 
respect to wage income and Social Security taxes, roughly half of 
which are imposed on employers.  Although Social Security taxes 
certainly affect the marginal  tax-rate structure, we  feel that 
explicitly addressing the Social Security tax issue is of lesser 
importance  than the  capital  income  issues  we  address  in this 
section.  Our justification for this  position is threefold.  First, 
labor supply distortions in  our model  are quantitatively  less 
significant than capital income distortions.  Second, the Social 
Security  tax does not involve the tax arbitrage opportunities  that 
are introduced when firms are allowed to choose different capital 
structures.  Third -- and this point is related to the second -- 
introducing Social Security taxes is likely to increase the costs 
associated with bracket creep; on the other hand, as we discuss 
later,  ignoring  capital-income-tax  arbitrage  will  yield 
overestimates  of  the  steady-state  losses  arising  from  the 
interaction of inflation and the tax system. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmas  Y*=(w,*+~  a,-,)/ (l+r)  .  It is easily verified that defining 
income in this way overstates capital income by na,-l/(l+n).13 
In the second set of simulations,  we also abstract from 
bracket creep, but introduce a richer asset structure into the 
model in order to capture some of the effect of tax arbitrage 
behavior.  Specifically,  we allow firms to purchase capital 
through the sale of two broad types of claims: debt and equity. 
Before proceeding to the results of these simulation experiments, 
we present a short digression on this extension of our framework. 
VII.  Debt and Equity in the General-Equilibrium Model 
Our expanded framework essentially follows Miller (1977). 
We ignore issues of risk, agency relationships, and so on, and 
assume that these asset types are distinguished only by tax 
treatment.  Equity finance is subject to two separate tax rates: 
a flat corporate tax rate, rf,  levied at the firm level, and a 
capital gains tax levied at the individual level.  Determination 
l3  A technical adjustment in the choice of tax bracket limits 
is necessary to isolate the effects of not indexing for capital 
income in our  cross-steady-state  simulation  exercises.  To  motivate 
the nature of the adjustment, consider an individual  whose taxable 
capital income is incorrectly adjusted for inflation according to 
the formula Yt=ia  -,/(l+a), which we know overstates capital income 
by an  amount equal to  the lost  value of principal due to inflation. 
Now consider an alternative economy with a steady-state inflation 
rate equal-to  n.  Taxable capital income in this economy is 
Yt=a,:,/(l+a).  It is  easily seen that,  with static  tax  brackets,  the 
marglnal tax rate applied to Y'  and ?'  will not generally be the 
same.  This type of distortion is distinct from the distortion 
created by nonindexation  of capital income that  we wish to  capture. 
To avoid this problem, we adjust the tax bracket limits in each of 
our simulations so that the only distortions are those that arise 
from not subtracting  the term na,-l/(l+a) in the calculation of real 
taxable income. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmof the capital gains rate is, of course, significantly 
complicated by the fact that capital gains are taxed only upon 
realization.  The effective marginal tax rate on capital gains 
depends on the statutory rate, the inflation rate, and the 
holding period of the equity instrument.  We simplify by assuming 
that, in the absence of inflation distortions, capital gains are 
taxed at a flat rate rg. 
With respect to debt finance, we allow firms to expense 
nominal interest payments fully.  These interest payments are 
then taxed at the individual level according to the personal- 
income tax-rate structure. 
Ignoring indexation for the moment, this extension of our 
simulation model yields the equilibrium conditions 
where iE is the nominal rate of return to equity, id  is the 
nominal rate of return to debt, and rP* is the marginal tax rate 
of an individual who is indifferent between holding debt and 
holding equity.  The tax rate rp* can be determined by noting 
that equations (8)  and  (9) yield the relationship 
(1-rP*)=  (1-79)  (1-rf)  . 
Individuals  who face marginal tax rates below rP* will 
choose to hold debt; those who face marginal tax rates exceeding 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmrP* will choose to hold equity.  Inflation distortions that alter 
effective marginal tax rates will, therefore, typically induce 
some individuals to shift between debt and equity. 
VIII.  Nonindexation of Capital Income:  Simulation Results 
The significance of capital-income mismeasurement, and the 
mitigating effect of tax arbitrage behavior on distortions 
created by the interaction of inflation and tax rates, is 
apparent from the results of the simulation experiments depicted 
in figure 4.  These experiments assume the benchmark parameter 
specification,  and include the case where the personal tax-rate 
schedule is applied to homogeneous capital income, the case where 
both debt and equity income are mismeasured for tax purposes (but 
taxed at different rates), and the case where equity, but not 
debt, income is indexed for inflation.  In each of these 
experiments we abstract entirely from bracket creep effects. 
The latter two sets of simulations incorporate our extended 
capital structure, and hence admit some scope for tax arbitrage. 
In these simulations, we assume a capital gains tax rate of 18 
percent and a corporate tax rate of 10 percent.  The 18-percent 
rate for capital gains assumes a real pre-tax interest rate of 6 
percent, a statutory personal tax rate of 28 percent, and an 
average holding period of 20 years.  14 
A corporate tax rate of 10  percent is almost certainly too 
l4 The capital gains rate is derived from the formula 
(l+r  (1-rg)  ) *=('l+r)  *-r ( (l+r)  T-l)  ,  where  T=  the  average  holding  period. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlow.  j5  However, combining a higher corporate tax rate with our 
assumptions about personal marginal tax rates would quickly yield 
values of rP* SO high that no individual would choose to hold 
equity.  Since we are primarily interested in the personal tax 
code, we have chosen to maintain our assumptions about the 
personal tax parameters, which we believe to be reasonable, and 
compromise on the corporate tax rate.l6 
As seen in figure 4,  the steady-state output losses caused 
by inflation when there is no indexation for capital-income 
measurement are uniformly higher in the absence of tax arbitrage 
opportunities.  This result is hardly surprising.  However, even 
when we admit tax arbitrage opportunities, the steady-state 
output losses are much larger than the losses that arise from 
pure bracket creep under the current indexing regime.  With a 
steady-state inflation rate equal to 4 percent and constant 
equity tax rates, annual output without indexation for capital- 
income measurement is slightly more than 2 percent lower than 
annual output in a zero-inflation economy for the benchmark 
parameterization.  Thus, with 1989 as the reference point, the 
l5  Estimates kindly provided to us by  Jane Gravelle suggest 
that the average effective  corporate tax rate is in the  range of 30 
to 40 percent. 
j6  Furthermore, our  inability to sustain the analysis with 
realistic corporate tax rates is almost certainly a result of the 
extremely simple problem with which we have confronted the firm. 
It is unclear to what  extent  introducing  a more  sophisticated 
capital structure problem would alter our conclusions.  We believe 
that the missing elements have to do with omitted costs to debt 
finance that would alter the arbitrage condition in equation (8). 
To the extent  that  these  costs are  invariant to the rate  of 
inflation, our analysis is probably robust to these omissions. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmannual real output cost of failure to index for capital-income 
measurement is about $87 billion ($348 annually in per capita 
terms, $4.5  trillion in present value terms).  This figure is 50 
percent greater than the output cost associated with a failure to 
fully index the tax-rate schedule for bracket creep. 
For a given tax structure and inflation rate, the larger 
output losses arising from capital-income mismeasurement relative 
to bracket creep do not correspond to larger revenues.  In figure 
5 we separately plot the simulated increases in steady-state 
revenues collected from capital-income mismeasurement and bracket 
creep for the benchmark parameterizations with rg=.18 and rf=.l. 
Although revenues increase steadily with inflation in the bracket 
creep scenario, the revenues raised from the capital-income 
mismeasurement peak at ~=.05  and decrease thereafter. 
This "Laffer curvew  associated with capital-income 
mismeasurement in our extended model clearly illustrates the 
potentially powerful effects of tax arbitrage.  The pattern of 
revenue shown in figure 5 results from the effect of falling 
incomes on marginal tax rates, and induced shifts from equity to 
debt.  As firms exploit the write-off provisions of nominal debt 
payments, corporate tax payments fall, more than offsetting the 
relative increases in personal tax payments at higher rates of 
inflation. 
In the bracket creep case, income does not decline enough to 
offset the higher marginal tax rates induced by bracket creep. 
Although arbitrage occurs, the net movement is from debt to 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmequity, and so both corporate and personal taxes increase in our 
simulations for inflation rates up to 10 percent. 
The relative inefficiency of raising revenues through the 
capital-income mismeasurement phenomenon is also apparent when we 
consider the output losses relative to equal revenue changes in 
the marginal tax-rate structure plotted in figure 6.  For the 
benchmark case with 4  percent inflation, output is just under 2 
percent lower in the capital-income  mismeasurement simulation. 
This difference represents an annual output loss of $78 billion 
in terms of 1989 GNP. 
The primary distortion from capital-income mismeasurement in 
the extended capital structure case comes from the failure to 
index capital gains.  It can be easily shown that, with perfect 
capital gains indexation and flat marginal tax rates, the tax- 
adjusted Fisher equation holds, and hence inflation is neutral, 
when the corporate tax rate equals the personal marginal tax rate 
of all debt holders.17 
Even when the conditions necessary for the tax-adjusted 
Fisher equation to hold are violated, indexation of capital gains 
is sufficient to eliminate most of the capital-income  distortions 
induced by inflation in our model.  The bottom dashed line in 
figure 4 depicts the steady-state output losses from simulations 
l7  The tax-adjusted Fisher equation is  given by i=r+a/(l-rp*) . 
The Fisher effect will hold under a progressive tax system with 
perfect capital-gains indexation if borrowers and lenders face the 
same marginal tax rate. Under the same  conditions, the  tax-adjusted 
Fisher equation would be valid were we to introduce a consumption- 
loans market. 
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equity income, but not to debt income.  At a 4 percent inflation 
rate, steady-state output in this situation is only -16  percent 
less than in the zero-inflation economy.  Even at a 10 percent 
rate of inflation, steady-state output is only about .3 percent 
lower than annual output in the zero-inflation economy. 
Figure 6  illustrates another interesting aspect of the case 
in which income from equity, but not debt, is indexed.  Revenue 
generation through capital-income mismeasurement with capital 
gains indexation is slightly more efficient than equal revenue 
generation through proportionate increases in statutory marginal 
tax rates. 
As is apparent in figure 7, the relative efficiency of 
inflation-generated revenues is dependent, at least when capital 
gains are indexed, on the preference structure and the level of 
the inflation rate.  Still, it is not surprising that our model 
includes some set of circumstances under which the output losses 
from nonequity capital-income  mismeasurement are lower than those 
associated with across-the-board rate increases.  The intuitive 
explanation is essentially the converse of the intuition for the 
inefficiency of raising revenues through inflation/tax-system 
interactions we have found in the simulations reported above. 
It is clear from the equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) that 
equity will be held by those individuals  who face the highest 
marginal tax rates.  Given the structure of our model, these are 
precisely the individuals who are the largest savers in the 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsteady state.  Thus, compared to the proportionate-rate-increase 
scheme, indexing capital gains, in some circumstances, shifts tax 
incidence toward those who account for relatively less of the 
economy's capital accumulation, thereby mitigating the 
distortionary effects of the tax increases. 
IX.  Summing Up the Costs of Nominal Taxation and Inflation 
We complete our investigation by  simulating the combined 
effects of imperfect bracket indexation and failure to index 
capital-income measurement, both of which are features of our 
current tax code. 
The steady-state output losses from these experiments are 
plotted for the benchmark parameterization, for the case with 
ac=l, and for the case with ac=5 in figures 8  and 9.  Figure 8 
plots results from experiments that abstract from arbitrage 
possibilities.  Figure 9  depicts results from the extended model 
introduced in section VII. 
Even for the most conservative of the three cases in figure 
6, the ac=5 case with separate tax treatment of debt and equity, 
a 4 percent steady-state rate of inflation reduces annual steady- 
state output by  almost 2.5 percent.  Using the 1989  reference 
point one more time, this figure implies a one-year output loss 
of a bit more than $100  billion.  In the ac=l case without 
operative arbitrage opportunities, the case with the largest 
distortionary losses, 4 percent inflation means an annual loss of 
$181  billion. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3 summarizes, for the benchmark parameterization, the 
comparisons of these distortionary losses with the losses from 
experiments with equal revenue rate increases.  We report the 
simulation results for steady-state inflation rates of 4 and 10 
percent, and have included for comparison the results from the 
simulation exercises reported above. 
The most obvious message of table 3 is that the full 
distortion is much greater than the sum of its parts.  For a 4 
percent steady-state rate of inflation, incomplete bracket 
indexation and the failure to index for capital-income 
mismeasurement result in a distortionary annual output loss of 
$117 billion relative to the loss from increasing marginal tax 
rates directly in our extended model with tax arbitrage 
possibilities.  The corresponding cost with 10 percent inflation 
is more than $260 billion (and more than $338 billion in the 
model without tax arbitrage opportunities). 
X.  Concluding Remarks 
Our analysis has important policy implications, the primary 
one being that the job of insulating the personal tax code from 
the distortionary effects of inflation is far from complete. 
Given the substantial costs that are likely to result from these 
distortions, we believe the cases for further tax reform or, 
failing that, for monetary policies that pursue the goal of price 
stability,  are persuasive.  However, we anticipate some possible 
objections to this conclusion. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe first of these objections involves legislative intent -- 
the belief that Congress was fully aware that inflation would 
eventually increase effective tax rates when it failed to fully 
index the tax code in ERTA and, later, in TRA86.  This belief may 
or may not be correct, but our analysis clearly indicates that, 
as a means of raising general revenues, reliance on 
inflation/tax-system interactions is inefficient and therefore 
costly.  If the functioning of government requires tax increases, 
we would be much better served by  legislating proportionate 
increases in statutory marginal tax rates. 
We are aware, of course, that normal economic growth will 
also result in a form of bracket creep.  However, we believe that 
bracket creep through real economic growth has much different 
normative implications than bracket creep that results from 
inflation.  In addition, we fully endorse indexing the personal 
tax code to nominal income growth per se. 
Our analysis indicates that most of adverse consequences of 
inflation/tax-system interactions for moderate inflation rates 
could be eliminated by moving toward contemporaneous adjustment 
of rate brackets and indexation of capital gains. Perhaps the 
failure to implement these features arises from a practical 
inability to  do so.  In this case, the analysis clearly points. 
toward a monetary policy that maintains price stability, or a 
rate of inflation that equals zero on average. 
The most common objection to a zero-inflation monetary 
policy is the presumed costs that would arise along the 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmtransition path.  We are generally skeptical of the view that an 
anti-inflationary monetary policy would necessarily have an 
adverse effect on real economic activity.  But what if it did? 
Our most conservative estimate of the full effects of 
inflation/tax-system distortions suggests a present-value cost of 
more than $6 trillion with 4  percent inflation,  even when 
measured relative to the output losses from an equal revenue 
increase in the statutory tax-rate schedule.  Does any sensible 
analysis predict that the recessionary effects of tight monetary 
policy would cause a present-value loss of this magnitude? 
Critics may argue that the numbers we derive from our 
simulations are generated from a highly simplified framework.  We 
concede the point, but certainly do not believe that our analysis 
is any less realistic than analyses that predict substantial 
costs from monetary policies designed to arrive at zero 
inflation.  At the very least, our estimates have the virtue of 
being generated from a general-equilibrium framework that is 
fully identified and not subject to the sample selection biases 
that contaminate many purely econometric estimates. 
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www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2:  Steady-state Output Losses From Bracket 
Creep Under Alternative Parameterizations 
Percentage Change 
in Steady-State 
parameterization  Out~ut 
10% Inflation 
Benchmark 
a, =  1.0 
a,  =  5.0 
Source: Authors' calculations.  Each entry records the percentage 
reduction in steady-state output, relative  to an identical 
economy with zero inflation, that results from the 
effects of bracket creep when the inflation rate is as 
indicated.  All parameters except the ones indicated are 
set equal to their benchmark values. 
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Table  3:  output  Losses  From  Inflation/Tax  Interactions 
Relative  to  Output  Losses  From  Equal  Revenue, 
Proportionate  Increases in Marginal  Tax Rates 
Percentage Difference 
in Steady-State Output 
11 












Source: Authors' calculations.  Each entry records the percentage 
reduction in steady-state output (dollar  value, in 
billions, of the steady-state output reduction using 1989 
as a reference  year), relative to  an economy in which equal 
revenues  are raised by proportionately increasing  marginal 
tax rates on personal income.  All parameters are set equal 
to their benchmark values. 
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